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Abstract: 
This article describes how partisan actors during the Obama years have escalated polarization by 
transforming policy disputes into constitutional contests over the ground rules of the federal 
system – contests, moreover, in which one bloc of politically like-minded states opposes another. 
The article examines in particular how Republicans have supported strong claims of state 
sovereignty, and in some cases resurrected the antebellum doctrine of nullification, to deny to 
either Congress or the executive branch the authority to reform state health care markets or to 
limit states’ emissions of greenhouse gases. Democrats have reinforced the partisan divide by 
declining to debate the constitutionality of their policies, instead invoking supposedly settled 
judicial precedent; and by enabling President Obama to create new federal policy through direct 
negotiation with like-minded states, thus circumventing congressional obstruction. Ironically 
both parties appear willing to shrink the power and authority of an already diminished Congress, 








Constitutionalizing the Dispute: Federalism in Hyper-Partisan Times 
 
During President Barack Obama’s two terms as president, the United States has been 
characterized by intense party polarization and deep ideological division (Rose and Bowling 
2015; Barber and McCarty 2015). The two major parties have moved toward opposite poles, 
though Republicans have shifted significantly further to the right than Democrats have shifted to 
the left (Abramowitz 2010; Mann and Ornstein 2013). One result of growing polarization in an 
era of divided federal government1 has been a sharp reduction in the capacity of Congress 
effectively to address important national challenges. As a result, political power and policy 
initiative have increasingly migrated to other institutions (Rose and Bowling 2015), including the 
executive branch, the federal judiciary, and state and local governments. 
In theory, to shift the locus of policymaking from a deeply divided federal government to 
the broad landscape of fifty states should moderate the effects of polarization. In Federalist 10 
James Madison argued that, under a well-designed federal constitution, factional rage “will be 
less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it.” Adapting 
Madison’s argument to the present, we should expect to find hyper-partisanship in a few states, 
but not in every state or across the entire federal landscape. If Congress and President are 
persistently at one another’s throats, we should expect to find the states intervening to mitigate 
the damage.  
There is no question that in practice state governments have partly offset the effects of 
our current polarization. The impact of the 2013 federal government shutdown on the daily lives 
of Americans, for example, would have been far greater if all fifty state governments had not 
                                                          
1 A Republican president (Bush) faced a Democratic House and Senate from 2007 to 2009. From 2011 through 
2016 a Republican House (and since 2015 a Republican Senate) has faced a Democratic president (Obama).  
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continued to operate. Moreover in a number of policy areas including health care, environmental 
protection, education, and immigration, President Obama has circumvented congressional 
opposition by collaborating directly with state and local governments whose policy aims 
converge with his own, by selectively enforcing federal regulations, responding to state 
concerns, and tailoring federal policy to the conditions and practices of each individual state. 
(See Bulman-Pozen and Metzger, Konisky and Woods, and Conlan and Posner, all in this 
volume).    
Yet shifting political initiative from paralyzed national institutions to state and local 
governments has not diminished polarization but instead has channeled it in new directions. 
Some state legislatures are even more polarized than Congress, some less so, but in the aggregate 
“the states appear to follow the national pattern of high and growing polarization” (Shor and 
McCarty 2011, 549-550). President Obama’s collaboration with like-minded states to sidestep an 
obstructive Congress does not remedy polarization, and might heighten it, because on highly 
contested questions such initiatives confront the determined opposition of a rival bloc of states. 
Thus in contrast to Madison’s prediction, our contemporary factional divisions tend to “pervade 
the whole body of the Union” as well as each “particular member of it.”  
Political polarization is typically measured by the distance, on a scale from most 
consistently liberal to most consistently conservative across a range of specific policy stances, 
between the positions occupied by the median member of each party (Pew Research Center 
2014). But another important marker of polarization, though one less readily quantified, is the 
extent to which Americans’ understandings of their shared Constitution likewise fracture along 
partisan lines.  
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We find highly polarized popular understandings on a number of constitutional questions, 
including interpretations of the Second Amendment and of the Constitution’s implicit right of 
privacy. My focus in this article, however, is increasingly polarized understandings of the federal 
structures established by the Constitution. Polarization of constitutional understandings in this 
domain is arguably more consequential for the future character of American politics than 
polarization on policy questions. Constitutional arguments – even if in the first instance they are 
deployed opportunistically -- carry wider effects that endure beyond the specific policy aim for 
which they were enlisted. Political leaders do not only engage in ideological disputes within a 
federal constitutional order, but also in disputes about this federal constitutional order, and – 
especially in an era of hyper-partisanship -- these deserve as much attention as contests over the 
substance of policy. Escalating constitutional disputes about the extent of federal authority over 
states and local governments are potentially more destabilizing than spirited disputes about 
individual rights. An unresolved dispute over federal authority to restrict slavery in the territories 
was the trigger for secession and civil war in 1861. 
In this article I describe how partisan actors in recent years have intensified the 
consequences of polarization by transforming policy disputes within Congress, or between 
Congress and president, into constitutional disputes over the ground rules of the federal system 
itself – disputes, moreover, that pit one politically like-minded bloc of states against another. 
During Barack Obama’s eight years as president a number of policy disagreements have in this 
way broadened into constitutional-federal disputes. Here I examine two: the federal politics of 
the Affordable Care Act (a.k.a “Obamacare”) and regulation of greenhouse gases under the 
Clean Air Act. The policies themselves are described in more detail elsewhere in this volume 
(see for instance Noh and Krane on the Affordable Care Act and Konisky and Woods on 
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environmental policy). My emphasis here is on the types of constitutional arguments these policy 
disputes have generated. 
I show that, at least in the two featured cases, Republican and Democratic elected leaders 
have advanced sharply different constitutional arguments about federal structure. I also argue 
that this constitutional polarization has been asymmetric. Republicans have resorted to strong 
claims of state sovereignty that consciously break with longstanding precedent, and in some 
cases have revived antebellum doctrines of nullification. Republicans have also been readier than 
Democrats to turn policy disputes into public constitutional debates.  At the same time 
Republicans appear internally divided on how far to press states’ rights doctrine at the expense of 
congressional authority.  
Democrats in contrast, at least in the two featured cases, were less likely to engage in 
constitutional debate at all. Instead they grounded their position on longstanding, apparently 
settled judicial precedent, on reinterpretation of existing statutes, and on rights-based arguments 
(e.g. a “right to health care”) advanced without much effort at constitutional justification.  
Thus polarization on questions of federal structure has not meant that partisans on each 
side voice substantially new constitutional doctrine pointing in opposite directions. Democrats 
have not, for instance, formulated fresh constitutional arguments to legitimate the federal powers 
their policies require but rely instead on what they claim is settled constitutional law. 
Republicans in contrast (and actors on the right generally) have advanced sharply new -- or 
newly resurrected -- states’ rights doctrine, while Democrats (and actors on the left generally) 
have declined to respond at length on constitutional questions. Democrats’ approach here might 
be viewed as a healthy way of preventing needless escalation. Alternatively, their constitutional 
non-response may reveal even deeper political fractures than would an open constitutional 
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debate. For hyperpolarization does not mean only that rival partisans hold sharply opposed 
political views, but more fatefully that they live in sharply disjunctive intellectual worlds. 
A note on method: in the case studies below I feature constitutional arguments made by 
elected leaders who speak or act from some specific location in the American federal structure – 
e.g., as members of Congress, state legislators, governors, or state attorneys general. In that sense 
this essay is an excursion into what has been variously called “popular constitutionalism,” 
(Kramer 2005), “democratic constitutionalism” (Zietlow 2011), or “constitutional construction” 
(Whittington 2001).2 Even if the federal judiciary is accepted as the final arbiter of constitutional 
disputes, it possesses no monopoly on constitutional interpretation and argument. Partisan actors 
play an enormous role in setting the judiciary’s agenda (as in the Republican-led constitutional 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act), furnishing its judges with arguments, implementing (or 
ignoring) its precedents and arguments, and of course appointing its members. The constitutional 
arguments of political actors who do not disguise their substantive aims often reveal more about 
the workings of American federalism than does the hyper-refined language of judges. 
In the conclusion I raise some normative questions about our current tendency to 
transform policy disagreements into constitutional contests over federal structure. I suggest that 
what matters for the future of American federalism is not only whether a policy dispute is turned 
into a constitutional debate, but also how this is done. 
  
Congressional Constitutional Debate on the Affordable Care Act 
                                                          
2 The meanings attached to these terms are broadly similar in referring to constitutional arguments and decisions 
made by non-judicial actors, but they are not strictly identical. Zietlow, for example (2011, 1371-1375) describes 
“democratic constitutionalism” as an important subset of “popular constitutionalism.”    
6 
 
The 2008 presidential candidates of both major parties declared that the U.S. health care 
system was in crisis. Both Barack Obama and John McCain proposed reforms designed to 
expand federal authority over state insurance markets, though in different ways. McCain’s 
proposal did not require all adults to carry health insurance (the so-called individual mandate) 
which as a component of the Affordable Care Act later became a central point of constitutional 
controversy.3 Nor did McCain characterize health care as a right, as Obama did, or promise to 
achieve universal coverage. But McCain did propose substantially to modify state regulations 
and state insurance markets by opening them up to interstate competition, to use federal authority 
to restrict state malpractice awards, and to federally subsidize coverage for low-income 
individuals or those whose medical conditions made them expensive to insure (McCain 2008; 
Commonwealth Fund 2008). McCain criticized Obama’s proposal on policy grounds but did not 
characterize it as unconstitutional (New York Times 2008). 
 By March 2010, when the Affordable Care Act was signed into law despite the 
opposition of every Republican member of both chambers, the political ground had shifted 
fundamentally, in part because the Tea Party movement had now become a powerful 
constituency within the Republican Party (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). By late 2009 some 
Republican members of Congress had already begun urging legislators in their states to prepare 
constitutional challenges to the ACA in the event of its passage (Dinan and Pickerill 2013, 17-
20). During the December 2009 U.S. Senate debate over the ACA (Congressional Record 
December 22, S13714 - S13744) the basic pattern of the constitutional confrontation had already 
been set: Republican senators, in addition to challenging the legislation on policy grounds, 
denounced it at length as unconstitutional (Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-TX, John Ensign, R-NV, 
                                                          
3 As a presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama supported requiring coverage for children but had not yet 
endorsed the full individual mandate later written into the Affordable Care Act. 
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Orin Hatch, R-UT); Democratic senators defended the ACA on policy grounds and mostly 
ignored Republicans’ constitutional criticisms. The only Democratic Senator to take up the 
constitutional question (Max Baucus, D-MT) introduced it almost as an afterthought (“Seeing 
nobody who wishes to speak, I wish to address the question of the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate”). Baucus did not voice any constitutional argument himself but instead read 
into the record the opinion of legal scholar Mark Hall who argued that, based on relevant 
precedents, the U.S. Supreme Court was unlikely to strike down the individual mandate.  
This pattern -- Republicans raising constitutional objections that Democrats largely 
ignored – continued during the March 21, 2010 final House debate on the Affordable Care Act 
(at this point less a debate than a public reiteration of entrenched positions). The first Republican 
speaker, Rep. Nathan Deal of Georgia, denounced both “the unconstitutional individual 
mandate” and “the unconstitutional mandate to expand our Medicaid rolls.” Deal announced that 
his state would join thirty-eight others “in suing to challenge the constitutionality of this statute” 
(Congressional Record H1856). Other Republican members echoed the claim: the ACA was 
“un-American and unconstitutional” (Rep. John Shadegg, R-GA, Congressional Record H1859); 
Democrats “carry the heart of our Constitution, bought in blood, and sacrifice it on the altar of 
political expediency” (Rep. Geoff Davis, R-KY, Congressional Record H1869); the bill was 
unconstitutional because it “moves far beyond regulating economic activity into the realm of 
regulating inactivity” (Rep. Scott Garrett, R-NJ, Congressional Record H1876).  
 For the most part Democrats during the House debate did not respond to Republicans’ 
constitutional objections. They accused Republicans of hypocrisy for posing as defenders of 
Medicare, which Republicans had denounced as “brazen socialism” when a Democratic 
Congress enacted it in 1965 (Rep. Steny Hoyer, D-MD, Congressional Record H1855). Six 
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months earlier, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi had issued a public statement dismissing “the 
nonsensical claim that the federal government has no constitutionally valid role in reforming our 
health care system.” Democratic reform efforts, Pelosi argued, rested on the same constitutional 
basis as Medicare and Medicaid, and were likewise grounded in Congress’s “broad power to 
regulate activities that have an effect on interstate commerce”; because “virtually every aspect of 
the health care system has an effect on interstate commerce, the power of Congress to regulate 
health care is essentially unlimited” (Office of Nancy Pelosi 2009). During the March 21, 2010 
House debate, Rep. George Miller (D- CA), one of the principal authors of the ACA, provided a 
similar but less sweeping constitutional defense. The constitutionality of the individual mandate, 
Miller argued, “is grounded in Congress’s taxing power but is also necessary and proper -- 
indeed, a critical linchpin – to the overall effort to reform the health care market and bring 
associated costs under control throughout interstate commerce” and to eliminate the moral 
hazards occasioned by requiring insurance companies to cover individuals with pre-existing 
conditions (Congressional Record, H1882). In general, Democrats treated the legislation’s 
constitutionality as firmly grounded in settled Commerce Clause precedent, and many followed 
Pelosi’s lead in dismissing Republican constitutional objections as frivolous.   
 That it fell within Congress’s broad power to regulate commerce was not, of course, the 
Democrats’ principal justification for the Affordable Care Act. Their central moral and political 
argument, both in the March 2010 congressional debate and in communications to the wider 
public, was that health care was “a right and not a privilege” (Rep. John Lewis, D-GA, 
Congressional Record, March 21, 2010, H1864; see also Rep. Carolyn Maloney, D-NY, H1871; 
Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, D-TX, H1877). A right to health care, however, is not guaranteed 
under the U.S. Constitution like freedom of speech and religion. In that sense it is comparable to 
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basic education, which is likewise not guaranteed by the federal Constitution. (Many U.S. state 
constitutions do include provisions for social and economic rights, in some cases including 
health care, though most such guarantees appear intended as policy guidance for legislators 
rather than court-enforceable claims; see Dinan 2009, 204-212.) Barring a constitutional 
amendment, under the U.S. Constitution any “right to health care” would have to be 
legislatively-created rather than constitutionally guaranteed (Zietlow 2011). Its legitimacy would 
depend on its being constitutionally permissible, not on its being constitutionally required. In 
passing a law designed to ensure that health care was “a right and not a privilege,” congressional 
Democrats implicitly engaged in legislative rights-creation within the bounds of what they 
judged to be the discretionary powers of Congress. But they did not explain its constitutional 
legitimacy to the public this way, relying instead almost entirely on the moral claim that health 
care was a right. 
The premise that the Constitution permits Congress to ensure affordable health care to all 
Americans grounds in turn the argument that an individual mandate is constitutionally legitimate. 
Here Oregon’s Democratic Attorney General John Kroger connected the moral argument for a 
right to health care with a corresponding constitutional argument much more clearly than most 
congressional Democrats did. In publicly defending the Affordable Care Act’s constitutionality 
Kroger wrote, “There is no constitutional right to force other people to pay for your health care 
when you decline to take responsibility for yourself” (Kroger 2011). It would follow, conversely, 
that if individuals have a right to refuse to be insured, then medical providers would have no 
moral, legal, or constitutional obligation to treat sick or injured individuals who were financially 




Individual Rights, State Sovereignty, Nullification, and ACA Opponents 
When the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was argued 
in federal court, the debate centered on where to draw the line between federal and state 
authority: who had legitimate power to require individuals to carry insurance – both federal 
government and states, or only the latter? Did an insurance mandate fall within the enumerated 
powers of Congress, or exclusively within the police powers of a state? In the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s NFIB v. Sebelius decision, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) a five-four majority agreed that it fell 
within the enumerated powers of Congress and thus did not unconstitutionally invade the domain 
of the states (see the article by Somin in this volume).  
Yet the political controversy over the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate was by 
no means limited to clashing views about where to draw the line between federal and state 
authority, though it took this form in federal court challenges and in many state attempts directly 
to block implementation of the law. Instead much popular opposition to the Affordable Care Act 
was motivated by the notion that any insurance mandate -- no matter who imposed it, whether 
Congress in 2010 or Massachusetts in 2006 -- violated some inherent (if unwritten) individual 
constitutional right. This view was especially prominent among the Republican Party’s 
politically important Tea Party constituency.4 The wider political-constitutional contest over the 
ACA was simultaneously an argument over federal versus state authority, and a dispute between 
two clashing individual rights claims: 1) that all Americans had a right to affordable health care 
(the congressional Democrats’ position) and 2) that all Americans had a right either to purchase 
or refuse to purchase health care (the position of some of the Affordable Care Act’s most active 
                                                          
4 The notion that any individual mandate violated individual rights led many Tea Party-affiliated Republicans to 
oppose Mitt Romney for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination, because Romney had signed into law the 
Massachusetts health care reform that included an individual mandate (Minnesota Public Radio 2011).  
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opponents). In practice the states’ rights and individual rights arguments against the ACA were 
often advanced simultaneously, but they can be clearly distinguished in principle, and sometimes 
also in the documentary record.  
In this respect the case of Virginia, the first of many Republican-controlled states to pass 
a “Health Care Freedom Act” in opposition to the Affordable Care Act, is instructive. HB 10 was 
introduced in January 13, 2010 and signed into law by Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell on 
March 24, the day after President Obama signed the ACA. As originally introduced, HB 10 held 
that “No law shall restrict a person’s natural right [emphasis added]…to decline or to contract 
for health care coverage…” The natural rights language was replaced in the final text of the law 
by a clause stipulating that “No resident of this Commonwealth…shall be required to obtain or 
maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage…” (Virginia 2010). The final language is 
thus equivocal on whether declining to purchase health insurance is a natural right, or a right 
created by positive action of Virginia in its capacity as a sovereign state. Several “Health Care 
Freedom Acts” introduced in other states likewise maintained that individuals had a natural right 
to refuse to purchase health insurance, and the claim was a common one on Tea-Party affiliated 
websites.5 
 But leading opponents of the Affordable Care Act instead settled on a constitutional 
strategy that highlighted state rights rather than natural rights, even if a sense of violated 
individual rights furnished the opposition with much of its political energy. Natural rights claims 
were unlikely to be effective in federal court. Moreover, even if refusal to purchase insurance 
were framed as a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment individual right, that argument could apply 
                                                          
5 For example Iowa’s HF 111 (2011), which passed the Iowa House but not the Senate, likewise spoke of “a 
person’s natural right…to decline or to contract for health care coverage…” For one of many possible examples of 
Tea Party affiliates’ claim that an individual mandate violates natural rights, see Constitution Mythbuster 2011.  
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only to the individual mandate, not the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid (leveraged by withholding 
existing Medicaid funds from nonparticipating states), its revenue-generating surtaxes, or its 
wider net of insurance regulations, which the law’s opponents also sought to block.  
The passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010 coincided chronologically with the 
contemporary resurrection of the antebellum doctrine of nullification in a number of state 
legislatures (Read and Allen 2012; Raynor 2015, 631-634). The Affordable Care Act was by no 
means the only target of nullification bills, which covered a wide range of political and 
constitutional disagreements between the federal government and states including firearms law 
(the field where aggressively nullificationist legislation has been most successful),6 land use, 
commercial and environmental regulations, and Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship. 
Conversely nullification, in the strict sense of the word, was by no means the only channel by 
which states served as vehicles for opposition to the ACA. But backlash against the ACA on the 
political right furnished essential political support to the nullification revival. 
However, the term nullification (often used interchangeably with “interposition”) can 
have both strict and loose meanings, which generates confusion.  In the strict sense, modeled 
after South Carolina’s 1832 nullification of the federal tariff, nullification means the theory that 
each individual state is fully “sovereign” and as such the final judge of its own constitutional 
rights and obligations; that consequently it may legitimately rule that any federal act – law, 
regulation, judicial decision, executive action, or treaty – is unconstitutional; and, most 
                                                          
6 See for example Kansas’s S.B. 102 (2013) which passed both chambers of the legislature and was signed into law  
by Governor Sam Brownback. S.B. 103 declares “null, void, and unenforceable in the state of Kansas” any federal 
regulation of a firearm “manufactured commercially or privately and owned in the state of Kansas and that 
remains within the borders of Kansas.” Any federal official attempting to enforce federal regulation with respect to 
such firearms would be charged with “a severity level 10 nonperson felony.” S.B. 102, adopting the state 
sovereignty language included in firearm nullification bills in many other states (see Read and Allen 2012), holds 
that the U.S. Constitution shall mean what was it was understood to mean in 1861, when the state of Kansas 
entered the Union. (The irony of choosing the year 1861 to speak about a supposed consensus on constitutional 
meaning appears to have escaped the framers of the legislation.) 
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importantly, that it may act on this judgment by forcibly blocking the implementation of that 
federal act within the state’s boundaries (Read 2009; Read and Allen 2012). But states can also 
challenge federal law in ways that incorporate some but not all of the above elements, and which 
we could describe as quasi-nullification. For instance, a state that declares a federal law 
unconstitutional and enacts legislation prohibiting state agencies from cooperating with federal 
enforcement may achieve the same goals as nullification without actively obstructing federal 
officials (for a useful taxonomy of the spectrum see Raynor 2015). Alternatively a state may 
enact legislation that conflicts with a federal law or regulation for the purpose of granting the 
state standing to challenge the law or regulation in federal court, without claiming any right to 
defy an adverse court decision. In contrast, nullification in the full sense would equally apply to 
federal court decisions, which were the principal target in the 1950s resurrection of nullification 
occasioned by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision (Read and 
Allen 2012, 283-287). 
With respect to state opposition to the Affordable Care Act, the picture can be 
summarized as follows: 1) Most of the legislation enacted by states in opposition to the ACA 
does not meet the strict definition of nullification; 2) Much anti-ACA state legislation rests on an 
implicit constitutional theory that would widen the scope of state sovereignty and significantly 
narrow congressional power to legislate under the Commerce Clause; and 3) ACA opponents do 
not agree among themselves on how far the claims of state sovereignty should be pressed. 
The most frequently-enacted and politically consequential form of anti-ACA state 
legislation follows the model recommended by the American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC), an influential and well-funded organization that promotes a conservative political 
agenda on the state level. As of March 2012 ALEC claimed that legislation modeled on its 
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proposed “Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act” had been introduced in at least forty-four 
states and enacted into law in twelve (ALEC 2012; 2014a). Virginia’s HB 10 (discussed above) 
in enacted form resembles the ALEC model. The distinctive feature of HB 10 is that it aims to 
block the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate without directly claiming to nullify federal 
law -- indeed HB 10 nowhere expressly refers to any federal law -- though the bill tacitly 
presumes that state authority overrides federal law on the matter at hand. The apparent strategy 
behind the law was to establish the state’s standing to challenge the ACA in federal court 
(Raynor 2015, 639). The text of the law stays clear of nullification claims that the federal 
judiciary would reject, and that might also produce division within the ranks of the ACA’s 
opponents. Legislation of this kind unquestionably demonstrated its effectiveness in enabling 
states to challenge the ACA in federal court.  
On the other hand, such an approach may have appeared too limited to those who sought 
to push federal practice in a markedly state sovereign direction. Some anti-ACA legislation 
enacted or seriously considered in other states made explicit the kind of sovereignty claims on 
which Virginia’s HB 10 remained silent. Utah’s HB 67 (2010), which was signed into law on 
March 22, 2010, took several steps beyond Virginia’s HB 10. The Utah law aimed to block the 
implementation of “any provision of the federal health care reform,” not only the individual 
mandate or the expansion of Medicaid. Among its purposes was to ensure that the state of Utah 
enjoyed full control over regulations affecting the health insurance market within the state; in 
this respect it implicitly denied that federal power over interstate commerce extended to the 
health insurance market. The law did not propose actively to block federal implementation of the 
ACA, but instead prohibited any “state agency or department” from participating in any federal 
health care reform, unless and until the state legislature specifically authorized it. In this respect 
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the law made a strong and wide-ranging claim of state sovereignty, while stopping short of 
nullification in the strict sense. Utah’s Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel noted 
that HB 67 “might violate the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI) of the U.S. Constitution” and added 
that “the federal government has legislated in this field for well over fifty years, since Medicare 
and Medicaid were enacted in the mid-1960s.”7 Thus in passing HB 67, Utah’s legislature and 
governor were consciously challenging five decades of precedent.  
Idaho’s HB 117 (2011) did attempt nullification in the strict sense. Echoing Thomas 
Jefferson’s 1798 Kentucky Resolutions draft, HB 117 declared the Affordable Care Act “void 
and of no effect” within the state of Idaho. The bill invoked the “Sovereign Power” of Idaho to 
“interpose between said citizens and the federal government, when it has exceeded its 
constitutional authority.” It denied to the federal government any regulatory authority 
whatsoever over health care markets in the state, which possessed “sovereign power to provide 
regulatory oversight of insurance content, coverage, benefits and beneficiaries within the state of 
Idaho.” No provision of the Affordable Care Act could be enforced or administered by any 
“departments, political subdivisions, courts, public officers or employees” of the state. Though 
HB 117 stopped short of imposing criminal penalties on federal officials, it empowered Idaho 
citizens to seek injunctive relief in Idaho courts against anyone implementing the law. 
HB 117 passed the Idaho House 49-20, but failed in the Idaho Senate, which like the 
House had a Republican majority. Republican Senate President Pro Tempore Brent Hill said he 
“agreed the health care overhaul passed by Congress last year was unconstitutional” but 
“couldn’t support a bill he thought also violated the U.S. Constitution” (quoted in Miller 2011). 
                                                          
7 See the Legislative Review Note that follows the bill text at Utah 2010.  
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Thus Idaho’s HB 117 highlighted divisions of constitutional doctrine among ACA opponents in 
a way that Virginia’s HB 10 did not. 
Congressional Republicans continued their effort to overturn the ACA even as the battle 
widened to state legislatures and federal courts. Much state-level opposition to the ACA denied 
that Congress had constitutional power to intervene at all in state health insurance markets. In 
contrast, House Minority Leader (later Speaker from 2011 to 2015) John Boehner sought to 
uphold congressional regulatory powers even as he asserted that key components of the ACA 
were unconstitutional. This balancing act is evident in his November 16, 2010 amicus brief in 
State of Florida v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, one of the U.S. 
District Court cases that paved the way for the Supreme Court’s ruling on the ACA’s 
constitutionality in 2012.  
Boehner begins the brief by observing that “members of Congress have an independent 
responsibility…to ensure that the Legislative Branch stays within the bounds of the powers 
afforded it by the Constitution.” He concedes that the Affordable Care Act’s “reforms of the 
insurance market” – including the elimination of lifetime benefit limits, ban on pre-existing 
condition exclusions, mandatory coverage of preventive services, extension of parental coverage 
to adult children under twenty-six, and cost control measures – “do fall within Congress’s power, 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate the interstate health insurance market.” He argues, 
however, that “Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce does not allow it to compel 
passive individuals to engage in economic activity.” In response to the argument that the ACA’s 
insurance reforms could not function effectively without the individual mandate, Boehner replies 
that, if true, this merely underscores the “ill-conceived” and “unrealistic” character of those 
reforms (Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Amicus Curiae Brief by 
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John A. Boehner 2010). The individual mandate, in short, was a constitutionally-improper means 
of propping up otherwise constitutional but ill-advised reforms of the insurance market. Thus 
Boehner’s brief mounts a broad political challenge to the ACA, in all its elements, while keeping 
the constitutional component of the attack as narrow as possible. Boehner’s concession that most 
of the ACA’s insurance reforms were constitutional did not represent the views of all 
congressional Republicans, some of whom – in tandem with legislative efforts in a number of 
states -- were determined sharply to restrict Congress’s power to legislate under the Commerce 
Clause (Lee 2015).  
 
Constitutional Engagement and Complacency and ACA Supporters 
In comparison to the law’s opponents, who had a well-organized and well-funded 
strategy to enlist states against the Affordable Care Act even before its passage, ACA supporters 
were slower to draw upon state legislators, governors, and attorneys general in the law’s favor. 
The earliest state publicly to defend the ACA’s constitutionality was Oregon under the 
leadership of state attorney general John Kroger, who was one of the law’s most effective state-
level constitutional advocates (Portland Tribune 2011; Kroger 2011). Oregon, however, was an 
exception. In the months immediately following the ACA’s passage, states denouncing the 
ACA’s constitutionality were more active, numerous, and eager to engage in constitutional 
argument than the states endorsing its constitutionality. For example, State of Florida et. al. v. 
United States Department of Health and Human Services was filed in the U.S. Northern District 
of Florida immediately after the law’s passage and eventually enlisted twenty-six states as 
plaintiffs, in comparison to four states that submitted an amicus brief in support of the law 
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(Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Amicus Brief on behalf of the 
Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan, and Pennsylvania 2010).   
As a rule the state governments that supported the ACA put less effort into publicly 
defending the law’s constitutionality than the law’s opponents put into challenging it. In 
February 2011 eight state attorneys general (representing California, Connecticut, Iowa, 
Maryland, New York, Delaware, Vermont, and Hawaii) issued a brief public statement endorsing 
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. The public statement, however, makes no 
constitutional argument whatsoever, but merely recommends the law on policy grounds and 
expresses confidence that the U.S. Supreme Court will uphold it (California Office of the 
Attorney General 2011). In this respect many of the states that supported the Affordable Care 
Act followed the lead of congressional Democrats in resting its constitutionality principally upon 
a brief reference to apparently settled precedent.  
Such minimal constitutional engagement from states supporting the ACA is in some 
respects surprising, because the law envisaged a key role for states in setting up insurance 
exchanges and tailoring policy to each state’s specific needs. The logic of constitutional politics 
would suggest that states were better positioned than the federal government to counter the 
charge that the ACA unconstitutionally intruded on state authority. As one amicus brief 
(representing seventy-eight legislators from twenty-seven states) argued, “Our Constitution 
creates a vibrant system of federalism that gives broad power to the federal government to act in 
circumstances in which a national solution is necessary or appropriate, while reserving a 
significant role for the States to craft innovative policy solutions that showcase the diversity of 
America’s people, places, and ideas. Far from violating state sovereignty or the principles of 
federalism,” the ACA “reflects the federal-state partnership at its best” (Florida v. U.S. 
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Department of Health and Human Services, Brief of Amici Curiae State Legislators 2010). But 
this constitutional argument came from individual legislators who were not officially speaking 
for their states. Most Democratic constitutional defenses of the ACA were limited to pro forma 
invocations of precedent.  
In contrast, many of the ACA’s opponents, as noted above, were open about aiming to 
break with longstanding precedent. Yet the eagerness of some Republicans to embrace highly 
restrictive readings of Congress’s authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause -- and in 
some cases nullification or quasi-nullification -- even as other Republicans (as in John Boehner’s 
amicus brief) seek to uphold the powers of Congress, suggests that there are sharper differences 
of constitutional philosophy on the political right than one finds on the left. The constitutional 
politics of the Affordable Care Act might be summarized as follows: the law’s supporters are 
united but constitutionally complacent; its opponents are engaged but constitutionally divided.  
 
Climate Change: Congressional Stalemate and State Activism 
 Congress has not passed a major piece of environmental legislation since 1990, when 
President George H.W. Bush signed into law amendments to the Clean Air Act (1970) 
specifically addressing acid rain, urban air pollution, and airborne toxics. The 1990 amendments 
passed by large bipartisan majorities in both chambers. Since 1990 scientific evidence of 
anthropogenic contribution to climate change has steadily accumulated (Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 2014; U.S. National Academy of Sciences and U.K. Royal Society 2014). 
But efforts in Congress to update the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases have failed -- in 
part because of the complexity of regulating a pollutant (carbon dioxide) produced by a wide 
range of human activities, but also because elected officials, like the American public, are 
divided along party lines in their views on the reality of climate change (Pew Research Center 
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2015). In 2009 the American Clean Energy and Security Act (HR 2545), designed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 17 percent by the year 2020, passed the U.S. House (then under 
Democratic control) 219-212 but failed to overcome a Republican-led filibuster in the Senate. In 
2014 the Republican-controlled House passed (229-183) HR 3826, the Electricity Security and 
Affordability Act, which would have overturned the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
decision, issued during Barack Obama’s presidency, to regulate greenhouse gas emissions as 
pollutants under the existing Clean Air Act. That bill failed in the Democratic-led Senate. Thus 
in a Congress marked by deep partisan division, no significant action either to regulate 
greenhouse gases, or decisively to block such regulation, has been enacted, and the locus of 
decision has shifted to the executive branch, the courts, and the states. The states have in turn 
been divided in their greenhouse gas policies, and particularly in their response to federal 
regulations, in ways that mirror the divisions between Republicans and Democrats in Congress 
and between Republican and Democratic presidential administrations.  
The first significant state challenge to federal greenhouse gas policy came from a pro-
regulation direction. In 2002, California passed the first state legislation to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions. (California had at the time a Democratic legislature and governor; the greenhouse 
gas initiative was later supported by Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger but opposed 
by Republicans in the California Assembly.) In 2005, during the presidency of George W. Bush, 
California requested a waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air 
Act to permit the state to adopt regulations to reduce automobile emissions of greenhouse gases. 
One feature of the original 1970 Clean Air Act was that, for reasons originally related to smog 
rather than greenhouse gases, California was permitted to set stricter auto emissions standards 
than were required nationally. If California were granted a waiver from the EPA, then under the 
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Clean Air Act other states would also be permitted to adopt California’s emissions standards 
(Congressional Research Service 2007). At the time of California’s waiver request, the EPA had 
not yet classified greenhouse gases as pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Air Act, and in 
late 2007 the Bush administration denied California’s waiver request. Even as its waiver request 
was pending, California joined eleven other states (Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington) and 
three cities (New York, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.) as petitioners in the federal court case 
in which the petitioning states and cities argued that “a prodigious amount of scientific evidence 
indicates that [carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases] are changing our climate” and that 
these gases should be regulated by the EPA under the Clean Air Act as “air pollutants [that] may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare” (Massachusetts v. EPA, Brief 
for the Petitioners 2006). The states of Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah took the opposite side in the case, arguing in their 
brief that the Clean Air Act “does not authorize EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for 
purposes of global climate change” (Massachusetts v. EPA, Brief in Opposition 2006). In a five-
four decision the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled – on statutory rather than constitutional 
grounds – that the EPA must either regulate greenhouse gases or “provide some reasoned 
explanation as to why it cannot or will not” do so (Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 [2007]).  
 
Clean Power Plan and State Opposition 
In June 2009, six months into Barack Obama’s first term, the EPA reversed course and 
granted California’s waiver request. In December 2009 the EPA issued a finding that 
“greenhouse gases constitute a threat to public health and welfare.” A series of EPA greenhouse 
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gas regulatory initiatives followed over the next several years. In June 2014 the EPA proposed 
the Clean Power Plan, designed to cut carbon emissions from stationary power plants by 30 
percent by the year 2030; the final version of the plan was released in August 2015 (U.S. EPA 
2015). Under the plan states are given broad flexibility to decide how to meet carbon reduction 
goals, so that existing coal-fired plants can stay in operation longer if offsetting carbon 
reductions are achieved through conservation, renewables, emissions trading, or other methods.   
In the meantime, as a result of Republicans’ victory in the 2010 elections, the institutional 
stances within the federal government with respect to climate change reversed themselves from 
what they had been during the final two years of the George W. Bush presidency. Now it was the 
EPA that issued greenhouse gas regulations and the House that sought to overturn the EPA’s 
action. Here, as with the Affordable Care Act, the ideological contests within Congress and 
between the legislative and executive branches were reproduced in the sphere of federal-state 
relations. The difference is that in this case, the contests centered not on freshly-passed 
legislation (as with the ACA) but on new regulations issued in the absence of new legislation. 
The roles of each state grouping (those supporting and those opposing carbon emissions 
regulations) in relation to the EPA also reversed themselves. In summer 2014, twelve states 
(Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wyoming) filed suit in federal district court to block the 
EPA’s proposed carbon-emissions rules for coal-fired power plants (Banerjee 2014). The roster 
of states suing the EPA later expanded to fifteen (Funk 2015). Thirteen states (California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New 
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington – nearly all of whom earlier participated 
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as plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA) and the District of Columbia joined the case in support of 
the EPA’s carbon regulations.  
As with the Affordable Care Act, the arena of state-federal contests over greenhouse gas 
policy has not been limited to the courtroom. As of June 30, 2015 seven states (most of them also 
parties to the EPA lawsuit) had enacted legislation designed to block or delay the EPA’s Clean 
Power Plan (Oklahoma’s governor issued an executive order to the same effect), and nine states 
passed resolutions urging the EPA to withdraw the Clean Power Plan (National Conference of 
State Legislatures 2015). Here too ALEC has provided model legislation and helped to 
coordinate state strategy (ALEC 2014b). In March 2015 the attorneys general of nineteen states 
(Louisiana, North Dakota, Nebraska, Ohio, West Virginia, Oklahoma, Alabama, South Carolina, 
Alaska, South Dakota, Arizona, Texas, Arkansas, Utah, Georgia, Wisconsin, Kansas, Wyoming, 
and Kentucky) signed a letter to the EPA asserting that the proposed rule for new fossil fuel 
power plants was unlawful (State of Louisiana et. al 2015). With the exception of Kentucky, a 
coal-producing state, and Nebraska, whose formally nonpartisan legislature has an ideologically 
conservative majority, the states challenging the legality or constitutionality of the EPA’s carbon 
emission rules had Republican-controlled legislatures. In several Republican-led states 
legislation has been introduced, but has not passed, that would either nullify all EPA regulations 
or prohibit state agencies from assisting in any way in their enforcement, on grounds that the 
Commerce Clause does not authorize federal regulation of the environment.8 
                                                          
8 See for example Indiana’s HB 1290 (2015); Oklahoma’s SB 354 (2013) which declares that “the rulemaking 
authority of the Environmental Protection Agency to control commerce and interfere with free market economies 
is nowhere expressly granted by the United States Constitution” and is therefore “null and void and of no effect in 
this state”; and Idaho’s HB 473 (2014) which likewise declares the authority of the EPA to be “null and void” within 
the state. All of these nullification bills failed, but they are nevertheless revealing for their denial that Congress’s 
Commerce Clause legitimately extends to environmental regulation. The policy aim of the Oklahoma nullification 
bill was substantively accomplished by executive order of the state’s governor.  
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Thus far the story of state opposition to the EPA’s stance toward greenhouse gas 
emissions appears to support the hypothesis that partisan actors will use federalism in similar 
ways, even as they pursue opposite aims: Democratic-led states challenged the greenhouse gas 
policy of a Republican president, and Republican-led states challenged the greenhouse gas policy 
of a Democratic president. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, in arguing that both parties use state-
opposition strategies in similar ways, lists the California-led challenge to the EPA during George 
W. Bush’s presidency as an example (Bulman-Pozen 2014, 1101-1102). The Democratic and 
Republican state-led court challenges to EPA greenhouse gas policy (under Bush and Obama 
respectively) are also alike in that both contest the EPA’s interpretation of sections 111(d) and 
112 of the 1970 Clean Air Act.9 Congress could resolve these contradictory statutory 
interpretations by amending the Clean Air Act itself, but this is prevented by the same 
ideological polarization that generated the legal disputes in the first place.  
But there are important respects in which the strategic options and constitutional claims 
of those who support EPA greenhouse gas regulations differ from the strategic options and 
constitutional claims of those who oppose them; here the two sides’ use of federalism is not 
symmetrical. First, those (predominantly Democratic) states that favor EPA greenhouse gas 
regulations implicitly endorse a broad enough reading of the Commerce Clause to legitimize 
regulation within state boundaries of a substance (atmospheric carbon dioxide) that is not 
                                                          
9 Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act “requires EPA to develop regulations for categories of sources which cause or 
significantly contribute to air pollution which may endanger public health or welfare.” 
http://www.epa.gov/region07/air/rules/111d.htm This was the section relied upon by Massachusetts et. al. in 
challenging the Bush-era EPA’s refusal to issue greenhouse gas regulations. Section 112 of the Act, “Hazardous Air 
Pollutants,” provides a specific list of pollutants that does not include carbon dioxide, and stipulates specific 
human health impact criteria for adding new pollutants to the list which arguably do not apply to carbon dioxide. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/7412 The states filing suit against the EPA’s Clean Power Plan argue 
that if carbon dioxide is not covered under section 112, it cannot be regulated under section 111 (d). See E and E 




literally bought and sold,10 and that consequently would remain outside congressional power 
under a narrow construction of that clause. The Clean Air Act of 1970, like many other landmark 
pieces of environmental legislation, was grounded constitutionally on the notion that air 
pollution was a “substantial effect” of interstate commerce and thus legitimately subject to 
national regulation. This broad construction of the Commerce Clause was apparently settled 
constitutional doctrine in 1970; in the last two decades Supreme Court rulings have narrowed 
congressional power in important ways, and today it is challenged to an even greater degree by 
legislators and legal theorists on the political right who seek to strengthen the claims of state 
sovereignty in a wide range of policy areas including environment, health care, and firearms.  
California and the other states that pressed the EPA to issue greenhouse gas regulations 
during George W. Bush’s presidency were clearly not claiming that the constitutional authority 
to regulate atmospheric carbon remains exclusively with the states. Politically their aim was not 
merely to be permitted to regulate greenhouse gases within their own boundaries (for which a 
state sovereignty argument would be sufficient) but to change national policy – and indeed, by 
force of example, global practice. The states that have challenged the Obama-era EPA’s Clean 
Power Plan also seek to change national policy, though in the opposite direction. But in this case 
a strong state sovereignty argument, one that denies that the federal government has 
constitutional authority to regulate carbon emissions within state boundaries, is conducive to 
their national political aims. The states pressuring the Bush EPA to regulate greenhouse gases 
made a statutory rather than constitutional argument. The states resisting the Obama EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan make (as shown below) both statutory and constitutional arguments.   
                                                          
10 Carbon emissions credits are bought and sold under some voluntary interstate consortiums like the Western 
Climate Initiative, and under the federal cap and trade bill that passed the House in 2009 but stalled in the U.S. 




In this respect the two state-led challenges are not mirror images of one another. Those 
who today enlist the states in the effort to reverse the Obama-era EPA’s greenhouse gas 
regulations draw from a wider range of strategic options than those who enlist states to support 
those regulations. For in the absence of new national legislation, advocates of greenhouse gas 
regulation must rely on the continued willingness of presidents and federal courts to read the 
1970 Clean Air Act language broadly enough to cover carbon emissions. Opponents, in contrast, 
have additional strategies if they lose the argument over statutory language. 
 
Cooperative and Uncooperative Federalism in Greenhouse Gas Policy 
One strategy available to states that oppose greenhouse gas regulations is to refuse to 
cooperate with the EPA in implementing them. The Clean Air Act was designed as an exercise 
of cooperative federalism, which as Daniel J. Elazar explains, “rests upon the idea that within the 
American federal system more interests are shared than not,” and that “cooperation is 
negotiated” among the levels of government responsible for implementing programs designed to 
achieve shared purposes (Elazar 1995, 41). In the case of the Clean Air Act, the federal 
government is charged with formulating air quality standards (which states must meet, and may 
in many cases exceed), providing scientific and technical expertise, and providing some though 
not all of the funding; while states and local governments are responsible for most of the day to 
day implementation of the law. The presumption is that federal, state, and local governments 
have shared interests in controlling air pollution, and therefore each level of government is 
willing to accept part of the administrative and financial responsibility for achieving that goal. 
Under the terms of the legislation, the federal government retains the authority directly to 
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enforce emissions standards without state and local participation, but the costs, both economic 
and political, of doing so on a wide scale would be enormous. 
The Clean Power Plan was designed in accordance with the principles of cooperative 
federalism, and among those states that share the Obama Administration’s view that climate 
change is an urgent threat, it has indeed functioned cooperatively. Rather than requiring that 
states reduce greenhouse gas emissions in a manner specified by the federal government, the 
Plan sets broad emissions targets and allows states to meet those targets in a wide range of ways, 
whether through state-imposed emissions controls, increased energy efficiency, shifting to 
nuclear or renewable power, or any combination of these approaches. The emissions targets 
established by the EPA for each state take into account that state’s past record in reducing carbon 
emissions, as well as its political history: other factors being equal, states that have a history of 
opposing greenhouse gas regulations face less demanding emissions targets (see Konisky and 
Woods and Bulman-Pozen and Metzger in this volume).   
But if the Clean Power Plan has functioned as cooperative federalism among those 
(predominantly Democratic) states that support greenhouse gas reductions, it has encountered 
fierce opposition among those (predominantly Republican) states that do not – despite the fact 
that the Plan makes less ambitious demands on anti-regulation than on pro-regulation states.  
Cooperative federalism is typically double-edged: to depend on a state’s cooperation means that 
the state can exercise power by refusing to cooperate. Heather Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen 
point out that the structures of cooperative federalism create opportunities for states to engage in 
“uncooperative federalism” – using the “regulatory power conferred by the federal government 
to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal law.” The California-led effort to push the 
EPA to regulate greenhouse gases, they argue, illustrates how state dissent from within the 
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framework of cooperative federalism can leverage changes in national policy (Bulman-Pozen 
and Gerken 2009; 1259, 1276-1277). They acknowledge, however, that states have often 
successfully used “uncooperative federalism” to relax federal emission standards (1276 n. 64). 
Those states opposed to national greenhouse gas regulations have indeed resorted to a 
strategy of uncooperative federalism, in a manner that continues and broadens the policy battles 
within Congress. In March 2015 U.S. Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) 
encouraged states to resist “the excessive and arbitrary mandates imposed by this regulation” 
[the Clean Power Plan] “under the guise of protecting the climate” by refusing to submit state 
compliance plans (McConnell 2015). Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin, implementing the 
strategy recommended by McConnell, on April 28, 2015 issued an executive order barring the 
state’s Department of Environmental Quality from developing an implementation plan related to 
carbon emissions, on the grounds that the EPA’s Clean Power Plan was unauthorized by the 
Clean Air Act and threatened the rights and freedoms of the people of Oklahoma (Oklahoma 
2015). The cooperative federalism built into the Clean Air Act, though it anticipated disputes 
over the terms of cooperation, presupposed that all levels of government agreed that air pollution 
was harmful and recognized a shared interest in regulating it. In the case of greenhouse gas 
emissions, what is disputed – increasingly along party lines – is precisely whether a problem 
exists at all. Cooperative federalism ceases to operate where there is no perception of shared 
interest between federal government and states.  
Oklahoma’s challenge to the Obama-era EPA is more radically “uncooperative” than 
California’s Bush-era challenge. California and the other states that pressed the Bush-era EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act made their case entirely on statutory grounds; 
they could not plausibly claim that any federal agency was constitutionally obliged to regulate 
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carbon emissions. Opponents of the Obama-era EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations make both 
statutory and constitutional arguments. The constitutional argument is that the EPA’s greenhouse 
gas regulations, at least as framed under the Clean Power plan, represent unconstitutional 
“coercing” or “commandeering” of state administrative agencies. The reasoning is that the Clean 
Power Plan violates the Tenth Amendment because implementing it would require states 
thoroughly “to overhaul their energy market,” “dramatically change their energy mix,” and 
revise regulations for numerous activities ranging far beyond the fence lines of power plants. 
Regulation of this kind “forces the states to act to carry out federal policy” in a manner barred by 
the anti-coercion doctrine set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898 (1997) decision (Rivkin, Grossman, and DeLaquil 2015). Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin’s 
executive order echoes this argument: the Clean Power Plan is illegal because it seeks to 
“regulate all aspects of state energy systems” (Oklahoma 2015). Mitch McConnell likewise hints 
at the Printz anti-coercion argument in urging states not to permit the federal government to 
“lock you into federal enforcement” (McConnell 2015).  
The anti-coercion argument against greenhouse gas regulations would classify as 
unconstitutional any federally-imposed steep reductions of carbon emissions, even if those 
reductions were authorized by new congressional legislation. In this sense the argument is not 
principally about executive branch usurpation of Congress’s legislative authority. Its more 
radical and surprising aspect (given Republican congressional leaders’ role in promoting the 
argument) is that it seeks to deny Congress, no less than the President, the constitutional 
authority to regulate carbon emissions. Under this constitutional view, Congress could indeed 
vote to prohibit federal greenhouse gas regulations binding on the states (as House Republicans 
did in 2014) but it could not constitutionally enact them. Moreover the specifics of the regulatory 
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rules would hardly matter, because it is difficult to imagine any federal policy designed 
significantly to reduce carbon emissions that would not entail fundamental changes in the energy 
policies of many states. What from one political perspective can be described as cooperative 
accommodation of state needs – the extremely wide range of methods by which states can 
choose to reduce carbon emissions under the Clean Power Plan – from another political 
perspective is denounced as wide-ranging federal coercion, because any aspect of state energy 
policy is potentially affected by the Plan. The same policy facts, viewed through differently 
polarized political lenses, produce radically opposed constitutional views.  
Here as in other instances where political actors make constitutional arguments, whether 
the argument will ultimately succeed in federal court is not the only question.11 Elected officials 
often make, and act upon, their own constitutional judgments long before (if ever) their actions 
are tested in court. Even if the federal judiciary ultimately upholds the constitutionality of the 
Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan, this would not prevent Oklahoma or other states from 
refusing to cooperate with the EPA in addressing an environmental problem many of those 
states’ elected leaders regard as imaginary. As long as beliefs about the reality of climate change 
continue to divide along party lines, judgments about the constitutionality of federal action to 
address climate change will be similarly polarized.     
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
11 On February 9, 2016, in State of West Virginia, State of Texas et al. v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agency the U.S. Supreme Court issued a five-four decision temporarily blocking the implementation of the Clean 
Power Plan. The ruling was issued on process grounds, to allow states opposed to the Plan additional time to make 
their case, rather than on the merits. Twenty-nine predominantly Republican-led states brought the case, while 
eighteen predominantly Democratic-led states weighed in to support the Clean Power Plan (Liptak and Davenport 
2016).   
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 During Barack Obama’s presidency, policy disagreements have readily become 
constitutional disputes over federal versus state authority – disputes, moreover, in which one 
bloc of politically like-minded states confronts another. An equally important and closely 
connected development is the growing ineffectiveness of Congress to enact new policy -- as 
opposed to blocking policy, for which it retains considerable power -- and the consequent shift of 
initiative to the executive branch, the judiciary, and the states.  
With respect to congressional paralysis, the Affordable Care Act is the exception that 
proves the rule, for it was enacted when Democrats held both the presidency and an 
uncharacteristically strong position in Congress. The greenhouse gas case is more typical of 
congressional deadlock in polarized times: a Democratic House passes a bill which dies in the 
Senate because of a Republican filibuster; a Democratic president issues new regulations that 
reinterpret decades-old legislation; a Republican House passes a bill to overturn those 
regulations, but it does not pass the Senate; Republicans then resort to state-initiated 
constitutional challenges and to more direct forms of state obstruction. Immigration policy, 
omitted here for reasons of space, has followed a broadly parallel course during the Obama 
years: a Congress unable or unwilling to enact new legislation, a President exercising substantial 
discretion in implementing existing law, and a constitutional challenge in which rival blocs of 
states line up on each side of the question.12 
It is not surprising that congressional Republicans would challenge President Obama’s 
broad discretion in greenhouse gas and immigration policy, just as congressional Democrats 
                                                          
12 See for example the pending case United States v. Texas, which the Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear. 
The case concerns states challenges to the Obama Administration’s deferred action policy for certa in categories of 
undocumented immigrants. Twenty-five states joined Texas as co-respondents in opposing the Obama policy (U.S. 
v. Texas, Brief in Opposition 2015). Sixteen states and the District of Columbia joined an amicus brief supporting 
the Obama policy and opposing that of Texas (U.S. v. Texas, Amicus Brief of the State of Washington et al. 2016). 
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challenged President George W. Bush’s exercise of sweeping presidential powers after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. (For discussion of war powers during the Bush and Obama 
administrations, see Fisher 2013, 201-265). Democrats tend to side with presidential power when 
a Democratic president faces a Republican Congress, and Republicans with presidential power 
when a Republican president faces a Democratic Congress.  Such constitutional opportunism is 
not necessarily dysfunctional. For it ensures that someone has a partisan incentive to challenge 
excessive executive power, and someone else a partisan incentive to defend its proper use.  
What is more surprising is that partisans in both camps appear willing to further sideline 
an already diminished Congress, even when their party enjoys a majority in one or both 
chambers, or expects to in the near future. On climate change congressional Republicans have 
sought not only to limit President Obama’s authority to reinterpret old law, but also to strip 
Congress itself of the constitutional power to regulate carbon emissions. In the ACA contest 
many Republicans, in and out of Congress, advocated sharp new constraints on Congress’s 
authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause. Democrats, for their part, have ritually 
invoked decades-old precedents supporting broad congressional power, but in practice have 
accepted the transfer of much of that power to the President. The parties’ policies and 
constitutional understandings differ significantly. Yet they apparently agree that Congress, as a 
body, cannot be trusted to legislate responsibly.  
There are good reasons for pessimism about Congress. The body’s diminished 
effectiveness cannot be simply attributed to presidential encroachment on its prerogatives, for 
much of its paralysis is self-inflicted. Yet to respond to congressional dysfunction by 
sidestepping the body or sharply restricting its role, as both parties appear increasingly inclined 
to do, will almost certainly make its pathologies worse. Nor will shifting power and 
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responsibility to the states (or to states in negotiation with the President) substitute for a 
Congress paralyzed by partisan division, because the same ideological divisions are reproduced 
across the wider federal canvas. Deep divisions between rival blocs of states are potentially more 
dangerous and destabilizing than divisions within Congress, where both parties have political 
incentives to preserve national coalitions and voice national goals. Ideological blocs of states 
have less incentive to do this, and their mutual opposition may sharpen geographical, cultural, 
and racial fractures in ways that the national parties themselves are powerless to prevent.  
How to remedy congressional pathologies lies outside the scope of this essay. The 
question I raise in closing is this: does turning policy disagreements into federal-constitutional 
debates inevitably worsen polarization? Or might the turn to constitutional debate sometimes 
have a moderating effect? Here the inquiry becomes normative as well as descriptive. For the 
question is not only whether a policy question is constitutionalized, but also how this is done.  
In principle a shared constitution establishes procedures for peacefully and 
democratically deciding contested political questions. A shared constitution also symbolically 
reminds citizens that they are members of the same political community and have important 
common interests alongside their political conflicts. But a shared constitutional text and tradition, 
like a shared religious text and tradition, can divide as well as unite; the double-edged potential 
is always there. The most destructive religious wars are not fought against unbelievers but 
against those one regards as apostates or heretics.  
Americans’ shared constitutional text and tradition have at times stoked destructive 
conflicts. After the 1860 election the slave states of the lower South seceded from the Union 
before president-elect Abraham Lincoln could take office, not only to defend slavery – though 
that motive was unmistakable – but also because they regarded the Republican Party’s 
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commitment to barring slavery from federal territories as a violation of the constitutional 
compact. Congress, slaveholders argued, was constitutionally prohibited from restricting slavery 
in any way. Indeed, they claimed, both Congress and President were constitutionally obligated to 
protect slaveholders’ rights in every federal territory. By this reasoning (see for example 
Jefferson Davis’s farewell speech to the U.S. Senate [Davis 2004, 190-194]) slave states had not 
only a right but a constitutional duty to secede from the Union upon Lincoln’s election.  
When the powers of Congress are interpreted this way – as defined almost entirely by 
what Congress must or must not do – then constitutionalizing a policy dispute will almost 
inevitably escalate it. In the contemporary cases described here, Republicans (and especially the 
Tea Party constituency) were most inclined to view the powers of Congress as exhausted by 
constitutional prohibitions and obligations: it was not within the power of Congress to pass an 
Affordable Care Act, or to restrict greenhouse gas emissions; instead members were 
constitutionally obligated to oppose such legislation, and to encourage states to resist it. 
Republican states followed by likewise denying Congress legitimate authority to regulate health 
care markets or carbon emissions within state boundaries. To constitutionalize a policy dispute in 
this way is almost certain to deepen partisan divisions, because Democrats, who might be willing 
to compromise on matters of policy, will not support a view of the Constitution according to 
which most of their legislative goals are rendered unconstitutional from the outset.   
Contemporary Democrats, for their part, have also escalated constitutional disputes over 
federal structure, though not in the same way. At least in the two cases examined here, 
Democrats endorsed a Constitution of broad permissions, not principally of prohibitions and 
obligations. They did not claim that Congress was constitutionally obligated to guarantee a “right 
to health care,” only that this lay within the permissible discretion of Congress. But such a 
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position itself requires a thoughtful constitutional argument, not just a reference to “settled 
precedents” that have clearly become unsettled in recent decades. To decline to engage in 
constitutional argument also deepens political divides because it implies that one’s opponents’ 
arguments need not be taken seriously, and it allows extreme constitutional doctrines like 
nullification to go unchallenged, except insofar as they are challenged by other Republicans.  
In closing I would suggest that we trust the democratic process enough to refrain from 
reducing every important constitutional question to strict prohibitions and obligations. There 
should be sufficient room for democratic discretion, for decisions constitutionally permissible 
even if not constitutionally required. We might democratically decide, for example, to 
decentralize power by shifting many decisions to the states. That is not the same as claiming that 
we must transfer these powers because Congress cannot constitutionally exercise them.  
The constitutional approach outlined here aligns more closely with contemporary 
Democrats than contemporary Republicans, but it presupposes a greater commitment to public 
constitutional reasoning than most Democratic leaders have displayed during the Obama years. It 
was Abraham Lincoln, the founder of the Republican Party, who in his First Inaugural Address 
best expressed the constitutional approach I recommend here.  Unlike the secessionists, Lincoln 
did not principally speak of constitutional obligations and prohibitions, nor did he treat the 
Constitution’s language as wholly determinate. He did not claim that anything in the Constitution 
obligated Congress to restrict slavery in the territories. Instead Lincoln highlighted the degree to 
which the Constitution was indeterminate on many key points related to slavery. He argued that 
in such cases Congress, as an elected body accountable to the people of the United States, ought 
to be permitted to legislate. “Any right plainly written into the Constitution” must be respected, 
Lincoln acknowledged, but he denied that the violations alleged by slaveholders fell in this 
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category. “May Congress prohibit slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly 
say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say” 
(Fehrenbacher 1989, 219-220). In contrast to those who aimed narrowly to confine the authority 
of Congress, Lincoln sought to expand the space for national democratic decision on matters like 
the expansion of slavery that affected all sections of the country. Moreover he sought to enhance 
democratic discretion not by muffling constitutional discourse but by inviting it. 
Lincoln’s appeal to a common Constitution, which he saw as permitting Congress to act 
on slavery where the Constitution was indeterminate or silent, did not persuade the secessionists, 
who preferred to risk war rather than concede the legitimacy of Lincoln’s election. Our current 
political climate is not as polarized as American politics in 1860, but it may well be more 
polarized than it has ever been since. Our polarization will not disappear anytime soon. Both the 
practical operations of our federal system, and the constitutional understandings that undergird it, 
will likely remain unsettled long after Barack Obama has completed his two terms as president. 
Under the circumstances, we would be wise to heed Lincoln’s call to honor our Constitution by 
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